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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A NEW
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN FOREIGN
POLICY
James E. S. Fawcett*
INTRODUCTION
Since the Second World War human rights have become a new
political philosophy, replacing both the liberal democracy that has
prospered in the developed world but failed to serve the Third World
and the Marxism that has succeeded in neither world. Governmental
organizations at the international and regional levels, such as the
United Nations and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, and nongovernmental bodies, such as Amnesty International,
attempt to maintain and protect human rights through collective inter-
national action. Individual nations have also made human rights an
object of their foreign policy.
Many nations invoke human rights as a standard of recognition or
acceptability of foreign regimes, as a ground for political or economic
intervention, or as a justification for the support of active dissidents
engaged in armed conflict with a particular regime. Human rights are
used tactically as a means of making a policy presentable and thus
mask objectives which have little to do with the protection of human
rights. A state may use human rights, for example, to create fear
among the citizenry of the expansion of an oppressive regime, in order
to maintain or increase military expenditures or to justify a budgetary
reduction of foreign aid. Major collective international actions provide
the framework upon which individual policies are built.
BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The rights of the citizen have developed over two centuries to in-
clude both the protection of life, liberty, and property from interference
by others and by the state, and freedom of expression, and assembly to
all, securing full participation in the life of the community. Developed
countries took for granted the social and economic structures on which
these admirable liberties rested. In 1943 the United States Supreme
Court described the classical framework of liberty as certain rights
President, European Commission on Human Rights; Chairman, British Institute of Human
Rights; Member, Institute of International Law.
Michael F. Bigler, Journal of Legirlation staff member, served as research assistant for
this article.
International Human Rights
withdrawn from "the vicissitudes of political controversy" and not de-
pendent upon the outcome of any election.'
The United States and the United Kingdom began to recognize the
need for a new approach to these basic rights. In the Atlantic Charter'
they declared that they would endeavor to further all states' access to
the trade and raw materials of the world. The Atlantic Charter further
expressed the desire for full economic collaboration among all nations
as a means of securing "improved labor standards, economic advance-
ment, and social security."?
The United Nations expanded these principles in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.' Articles 22-25 affirm the right to em-
ployment at an adequate standard of living and the right to financial
support in case of unemployment or other exigent circumstances.6 It
was argued that for poor developing countries civil and political rights
and liberties are, at best, insufficient and, at worst, a facade for an ade-
quate standard of living. Indeed, certain of these rights may be incom-
patible with rapid economic growth.'
In the decade following the Universal Declaration, the United Na-
tions became a forum for social claims to higher standards of life and
development, to a fairer distribution of resources, and to the end of
colonial rule in many parts of the world. The Declaration recognized
that for many countries satisfaction of the economic and social needs of
their people was a more difficult and tedious process than the adoption
of minimum standards of civil and political rights.
Progressive assertion of the principle of self-determination
culminated in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Co-
lonial Countries and Peoples (1962). 8 The first paragraph of this Dec-
laration was later repeated in both the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights' and the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial, and Cultural Rights.'" The marked tendency in the United Na-
1. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
2. Atlantic Charter, Aug. 14, 1941, United States-United Kingdom, 55 Stat. 1603, T.I.A.S. No.
686.
3. Id. fourth principle.
4. Id. fifth principle.
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Universal Declaration].
6. Id. art. 22-25.
7. See G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (W. Butler trans. 1974). Economic
development is not politically neutral. See generally AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVEL-
OPMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
16 (1976).
8. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted
by. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [herein-
after cited as Declaration on the Grantm of Independence].
9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Civil and Political
Rights Covenant]. Article 1, paragraph 1, of that covenant states: "All peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
10. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted by G.A. Res.
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tions has been to treat self-determination as an escape from colonial
rule and alien regimes that results in independence." I Although India
has not been eager to see the United Nations encourage self-determina-
tion in Kashmir or Hyderabad, Sikkim, or Assam, the Indian govern-
ment condemns racist regimes. Yet, who are the "peoples" protected
by this declaration? Are the populations of Nigeria or Iraq or Mauri-
tius protected? Are the Biafrans, the Kurds, the Palestinians, the
Basques, and the Welsh also protected?
In the elaboration of the principles of the Universal Declaration in
the United Nation Covenants, a working distinction was made between
"legal rights" and "programme rights." 2 Legal rights require a state to
take the "necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional
processes and with the provisions of the Civil and Political Rights Cov-
enant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary
to give effect to those rights."' 3 Programme rights progressively pur-
sue, through economic and technical assistance and cooperation, the
full realization of these rights.4
It is essential to consider the obstacles and constraints upon coun-
tries that limit active relations with foreign regimes in response to vio-
lations of human rights. Further, it is important to examine means of
foreign policy available to influence or coerce an oppressive regime to
change its practices.
Intervention by way of economic coercion or other political meas-
ures is not inconsistent with contemporary international law, provided
that it is aimed at the protection of human rights and not dispropor-
tionate to that aim. States, by selecting, collectively or individually,
some target countries and not others for such intervention, often cast
doubt on the purposes of their foreign policy. Nevertheless, it would be
a mistake to accuse states of discrimination and hypocrisy, for it is a
step forward for the world that human rights have become a matter of
genuine international concern at all. It is arguable, then, that pressure
to protect individuals or groups or to secureoa general observance of
human rights under a foreign regime is best exerted by government
diplomacy at the first stage. Government diplomatic exchanges may
receive little publicity, making concessions by the target country that
much easier. Both the United States Department of State and the
United Kingdom Foreign Office have experienced their successes here.
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Covenant].
11. The preamble of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence, supra note 8, speaks of
the ardent desire for "the end of colonialism in all its manifestations," but the enabling
clauses do not mention colonialism and speak instead of the right to self-determination and
independence.
12. Legal rights are the subject of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 9. Pro-
gramme rights are the subject of the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, supra
note 10.
13. Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 9, at art. 2, para. 2.
14. Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Covenant, supra note 10, at art. 2, para. 1.
[Vol. 8:220
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INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AS GUARANTEES
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Clearly, the adoption of conventions, declarations, or bills of rights
does not ensure their observance or make them an effective safeguard.
They do serve, however, as a political standard of achievement. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 5 elaborated in the two
United Nations Covenants 6 and the substantive provisions in many
national constitutions, provides at least a first line of defense for human
rights.
Since the adoption of the United Nations Covenants in 1966, sixty-
three countries, less than one-half the membership of the United Na-
tions, have become parties to the Covenants. Absentees include the
United States, Israel, Egypt, Nigeria, China, and Indonesia. The par-
ties to the Covenants include the Soviet Union and all of Eastern Eu-
rope, Chile, Libya, and Iran. Of the sixty-three countries that are
parties to the Covenants only about a third could be described, by
political structure and by level of economic development, as broadly
democratic. More than a third of these nations subsist at levels of in-
come and productivity less than half that of the poorest industrialized
countries, and many have an average life expectancy of less than fifty
years. '7
The standards for the recognition and protection of human rights,
therefore, will vary. Foreign policy must take account of the rights and
freedoms demanded, the ability of the country concerned to meet the
standards, and the scale of non-observance. Rights and freedoms are
often described, though seldom defined, as fundamental. It is difficult
to describe them as inalienable when reserved rights and freedoms are
declared subject to qualifications or restrictions under the Covenants
and Conventions.' 8
International instruments generally agree on a limited number of
prohibitions that cannot be transgressed in any circumstances. Instru-
ments uniformally prohibit torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment; slavery or servitude; retroactive offenses or penalties;
and the nonrecognition of anyone as a person before the law.' 9 The
15. Universal Declaration, supra note 5.
16. Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 9; Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
Covenant, upra note 10.
17. W. BRANDT & INDEPENDENT COMM'N ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, NORTH-
SOUTH: A PROGRAMME FOR SURVIVAL 32 (1980).
18. Civil and Political Rights Covenant, upra note 9; Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
Covenant, supra note 10; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, (1955-19571 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 4 [hereinafter
cited as European Convention on Human Rights]; American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/Ser. A/16, Eng. T.S. No. 36, at 1-21.
19. Article 4 of the Universal Declaration states, "No one shall be held in slavery or servitude;
slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms." Universal Declaration,
supra note 5. The Declaration also proclaims that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" and that "[elveryone has the right
to recognition everywhere as a person before the law." Id. art. 4, 6.
The European Convention on Human Rights declares that "[nmo one shall be subjected to
19811
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2" the European
Convention,2' and the Inter-American Convention 22 enumerate other
rights and freedoms which a party may not infringe even in war or
other public emergency.
The four prohibitions are described in Economic and Social Coun-
cil (ECOSOC) Resolution 1503-XLVIII 23 which authorizes the Sub-
commission on Human Rights24  to investigate and report on
apparently persistent patterns of gross violations of human rights. If
simply an isolated incident, the United Nations will not take action.
Violations must not only be "gross" but repeated, systematic, and ad-
ministrative in nature.25 The descriptive term, "gross," refers to both
the degree or severity of the abuse and the nature of the rights in-
volved.
Despite numerous complaints made to the Subcommission on
Human Rights of clear violations in the last decade, the record of ac-
tion is poor. Only those violations arising in Chile and in Middle East-
ern areas under occupation have gained the Subcommission's full
attention.26 It is unclear what constraints have acted to limit interna-
tional action on these alleged violations.
APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION
Human Rights as a Matter of International Concern
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter2 7 raises the issue of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of a country. Although the Charter
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." European Convention on
Human Rights, art. 3, Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 6. It forbids "slavery or servi-
tude" and "forced or compulsory labour." .d. art. 5 (1) & (2). It also provides that
"[elveryone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally, save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a
crime for which this penalty is provided by law." Id. art. 2(l).
20. Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 9.
21. European Convention on Human Rights, Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 4.
22. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, (O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/Ser.
A/16, Eng. . . O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, at 1-21).
23. Procedure for Dealing with Communications Relating to Violations of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, adopted by E.S.C. / Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 14) 8,
U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add. 1 (1970).
24. The Subcommission was originally established as the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.
25. E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 14) 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add. 1, at para. 1,
requires that before any communication receives consideration by the Sub-Committee that it
"appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations."
26. See Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Publication No.
E.68.XIV.2, at 5 (1968); G.A. Res. 2443(XIII), reprinted in XII D. DJONOVICH, UNITED NA-
TIONS RESOLUTIONS: GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Ser. 1, at 124 (1975).
27. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7, states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement meas-
ures under Chapter VII.
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter deals with "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." U.N. CHARTER art. 39-51.
[Vol. 8:220
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limits intervention by the United Nations as a body,28 it has never been
treated as excluding either United Nations investigation of reported de-
nials of human rights or recommendations regarding them. General
Assembly Resolution 2625(XXIX) states uncompromisingly that "no
state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other
type of measure to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from
it advantages of any kind." '29 The Helsinki Final Act3" and the Organi-
zation of American States Charter"1 repeat these provisions in sub-
stance.
The critical question is whether the observance of human rights is a
matter within the internal affairs of states. State practice, not least in
the adoption of the United Nations Charter and other international
conventions, evinces that the recognition and protection of human
rights have become matters of international concern and obligation.
Although the undertakings set forth in international human rights in-
struments are primarily implemented through domestic law and prac-
tice as obligations essentially towards individuals, a state's adoption of
these instruments and of the United Nation Charter creates obligations
erga omnes.
32
If we understand human rights to be specific and needs to be com-
mon to all human beings independent of the society to which the
human being belongs, then the various international human rights in-
struments state political axioms that underlie democracy. Authorita-
rian rule, with its philosophical negation of these common rights,
reaches beyond national borders and so may constitute a threat to de-
mocracy. There is a widely held belief that such oppression can spread
and that systematic denial of human rights in one country may threaten
the security and stability of others. Indeed, it is possible that we are
witnessing a half-articulated identification of aggression as a repudia-
tion of human rights. Whether the principle of non-intervention is an
obstacle to states' active policies towards foreign regimes which do not
observe or protect human rights remains to be seen.
Use of Force and Coercion to Secure Observance of Human Rights
Because human rights are matters of common, international con-
28. The U.N. CHARTER gives only the power of recommendation to the General Assembly. See
id art. 10-14. Intervention can come only through the Security Council. See id. art. 34, 36,
39-42.
29. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-oper-
ation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by G.A.
Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), U.N. Doec. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Declaration Concerning Co-operation Among States].
30. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, reprintedin 14
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1292 (1975).
31. Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, art. 16, 17, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
2420, T.I.A.S. No. 2361.
32. This term is defined as "affecting everybody." See U.N. CHARTER preamble.
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cern, they exist outside the jurisdiction of any one country. Every state,
therefore, has an interest in their observance and perhaps a duty to
secure that observance by varying degrees of intervention.
The reasoning of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the
South West Africa Cases3 3 is illustrative. In 1962 a narrow majority
held that the Members of the League of Nations possessed a legal right
or interest in the observance by the Mandatory of its obligations both
toward the inhabitants of the Mandated Territory, and toward the
League of Nations and its Members. The international conventions on
human rights, then, are analogous by establishing obligations for States
toward individuals within their jurisdiction and toward the interna-
tional community.
34
Although in 1966 the new majority of the ICJ interpreted "legal
interest" in a narrower way, it nevertheless did not reject the possibility
of state action to secure performance by another state. 35 The court ob-
served that "states may be entitled to uphold some general principle
even though the particular contravention of it alleged has not affected
their own material interests. 36 Without specifying when such action is
permissible, the court confined itself to the scope of "legal interest" in
the case before it.
However, Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter restricts states
"from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of any State."37 A curious feature of this provision is
that it is the only place in the Charter where the "use of force" is not
qualified by the word, "armed." Although force used against the terri-
torial integrity of a state could hardly be anything other than armed
force, a state's political independence could be impaired by the use, or
even threat, of force in the form of economic coercion. 38 General As-
sembly Resolution 2625(XXV) distinguishes between "armed interven-
tion and other forms of interference," including interference against
"economic elements" and suggests that the purpose and effect of Article
2(4) limit the use of armed force.39 Resolution 2625(XXV) further sug-
gests that the omission of "armed" in Article 2(4) was an oversight in
33. Preliminary Objections in the South-West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v.
South Africa), [1962] I.C.J. 319. This material is digested in Stevenson, Judicial Decisions, 57
AM. J. INT'L L. 640-59 (1963).
34. See Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Beig. v. Spain), Second Phase,
[1970] I.C.J. 3. The case is digested and excerpted in Evan, Judicial Decisions, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 653 (1970).
35. South-West Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, [1966]
I.C.J. 6. These cases are digested and excerpted in Stevenson, Judicial Decisions, 61 AM. J.
INT'L L. 116 (1967).
36. South-West Cases, Second Phase, [1966] I.C.J. at 32.
37. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
38. For example, the Preamble of the Charter makes it an objective of the United Nations "to
ensure. . . that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest." Articles 41 and
46 of the CHARTER envisage the use of "armed force" by the Security Council, and in Article
44 where the Security Council has "decided to use force," it is plain that armed force is
meant.




Economic coercion is constrained by the principal declarations.
General Assembly Resolution 2625(XXIX)4 I condemns the use of eco-
nomic measures as a means of coercion against another state if those
measures are to secure any kind of advantage from that state. Human
rights policy secures no special advantage to the implementing state;
thus, Resolution 2625 (XXIX) would allow economic coercion to se-
cure the observance of human rights. Finally, the anti-colonial spirit,
which has often shaped General Assembly attitudes and declarations,
has created a special position for oppressed peoples in the uses of force.
Contemporary international law, as expressed in the United Na-
tions Charter4 2 and in state practice, does not prohibit economic coer-
cion or other political measures designed to influence and change the
practice of foreign regimes concerning the protection of human rights.
Indeed, the principle of non-intervention, traditionally derived from
the legal fictions of the equality and independence of sovereign states,43
has lost its absolute character as a result of the growing interdepen-
dence among nations.
FOREIGN POLICY AS A TOOL TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS
The means of foreign policy available to influence or coerce
changes in the practices of an oppressive regime have not been clearly
established. The principle of non-intervention remains a constraint on
economic coercion or other political measures that are disproportionate
in scope or ambiguous in purpose and thus extend beyond the permit-
ted objective of protecting human rights. In other words, it would be
an abuse of rights to invoke the non-observance of human rights as a
ground for a trade embargo against a foreign regime or to adopt ex-
panded defense measures if the real object is commercial or strategic
advantage.
The means of foreign policy designed to protect human rights are
manifold. In the diplomatic realm, private representation may be
made in defense of particular victims or against a pervasive, inhuman
practice. These representations may be strengthened by making pro-
tection of human rights an issue in intergovernmental negotiations of
trade or aid agreements or even a condition of their enactment. Diplo-
matic relations may be broken off. Governments may resort to public
40. For a discussion of the various opinions on the meaning of Article 2(4) of the U.N. CHAR-
TER, see Note, "Force" Under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter The Question of
Economic and Political Coercion, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 101 (1979).
41. Declaration Concerning Co-operation Among States, supra note 29.
42. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
43. The enabling clause of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence states, "All armed
action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in
order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence,
and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected." Declaration on the Granting
of Independence, supra note 8.
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declarations in the nation's representative body and news media.
Stronger measures may be taken, for example, in the reduction of
financial aid, in the reduction or cancellation of arms sales, or in the
termination of transfers of technology."
The United States Foreign Assistance Act45 is an example of a
broad declaration of human rights policy, the type of measures neces-
sary for its implementation and the conditions for their use. Section
502B states that "a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United
States shall be to promote the increased observance of internationally
recognized human rights by all countries."'  Consequently, "no secur-
ity assistance may be provided to any country [whose] government...
engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights."47 In addition, international "security assist-
ance" programmes must avoid identifying the United States with such
governments.48
Three elements of Section 502B should be noted. First, "security
assistance" consists essentially of military assistance, including military
training, sales, and licensing of defense articles and services, and exten-
sions of credits under the Arms Export Control Act.49 Second, to jus-
tify withdrawal of security assistance from the foreign regime the
denial of human rights must constitute a "consistent pattern of gross
violations."5 Finally, the President, notwithstanding these provisions,
44. The United States Department of State under the Carter Administration used four "tools"
for coercing respect for human rights by other nations:
(i) A device of first resort was "steady, quiet diplomacy" (distinguished from silent diplo-
macy), which is quiet "in the sense that it does not reach the public," and in fact seemed
quite noisy to the governments involved.
(2) Where quiet diplomacy proved insufficient, the Department of State used "carefully
selected public statements to bring the focus of world opinion to bear on the violating coun-
try."1
(3) Another tool was to "encourage other democratic countries which [enjoyed] better
standing with a particular government, to join in the efforts to foster greater respect for
human rights." Notable was the United Kingdom's work in the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia situa-
tion.
(4) Finally, decisions were made on the level and type of economic and military assistance,
for example, § 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Derian, Human Rights in Ameri-
can Foreign Policy, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 264, 271-72 (1979). See also Vance, Human
Rights andAmerican Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 223 (1977).
45. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2429b (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
46. Id. § 2304(a)(1).
47. Id. § 2304(a)(2).
48. See generally Agencyfor International Development, Legal Interpretations-§ 116 ofthe For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations of
the House Comm on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1976).
49. 22 U.S.C. § 2341 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
50. See Resolution 8 of the United Nations' Economic and Social Council, adoped in 1967,
regarding the Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommission on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities, 42 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 6), U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/490, at 131 (1967).
The legislative history of section 502B and section 116 suggests little as to how the phrase
"consistent pattern" should be construed. At a minimum, this language seems to suggest that
a single incident will not establish governmental responsibility within the meaning of either
provision. Ermacora, Procedure to Deal with Human Rights Violations: 4 Hopeful Start in the
UN, 7 HuMAN RIGHTS J. 678 (1976). Instead, the violations must recur often enough to be
identified as a distinct cause of action. Ermacora suggests that ECOSOC use of this language
[Vol. 8:220
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may certify to Congress that "extraordinary circumstances" justify pro-
visions of assistance in the form of military education and training to a
regime in violation of the act.5'
Despite the declaration of a human rights policy in the United
States, the stringent requirements for "intervention" and the exceptions
to that requirement nonetheless, cast doubt as to the actual role that
human rights play in United States foreign policy.
CONCLUSION
As the issue of individual human rights has developed into a tool of
international politics, protection of these rights has become a matter
subject to international, rather than purely national, jurisdiction. Al-
though the record of international action on behalf of human rights is
still scant, international covenants set forth minimum standards, and
non-intervention is no longer an absolute in international relations.
Nations may use international fora and foreign policy as tools to pro-
mote observance of human rights. By implementing measures that en-
courage adherence to guidelines regarding protection of human rights,
individual nations can further the development of international guar-
antees of human rights.
indicated a time element inherent in the operative language. In other words, the violation
must be one with a certain continuity whose end cannot be foreseen.
51. 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (Supp. III 1979).
1981]
